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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a decision in District Court on the parties' cross- motions for 
summary judgment. Plaintiff, Jennifer Eastman, filed this declaratory judgment action 
asking the court to find she is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) under her 
policy of insurance with Farmers Insurance Company. Defendant, Farmers, asserted that 
the Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage since she was injured while traveling in 
another vehicle (Van) that carried its own UIM policy. Plaintiff asserts that since the at-
fault vehicle and the Van had inadequate insurance to cover her injuries, Plaintiff can 
look to her remaining UIM coverage with Farmers to pay her uncompensated damages. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the District Court ruled 
in Defendant's favor. Plaintiff argued that she was entitled to UIM coverage as a matter 
of law based on the public policy and contractual changes made to UIM coverage in the 
2008 amendements to I.C. § 41-2502. Defendant argued that Plaintiff is not entitled to 
UIM coverage as a matter of law based upon the Court's decision in Purdy v. Farmers 
Insurance Company, 65 P.3d 184 (2002). 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
No facts are in dispute and both parties argue they are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. On June 21, 2016 Plaintiff filed her declaratory judgment 
action seeking UIM coverage. (R. 11) Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
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On December 1, 2016 the District Court granted Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and denied Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. (R. 333) In reaching its 
decision the District court concluded that Plaintiffs arguments were better suited for the 
Supreme Court. (R. 317-335). 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts are primarily cited from Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment. (R. 171-174) The parties did not dispute any material 
facts in their cross-motions for summary judgment. (See R. 321) 
I. Jennifer Eastman is a 35-year-old registered nurse employed by Providence 
Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington. She is a single mother of one and 
resides in Post Falls, Idaho. On March 18, 2014, Jennifer was a passenger in a Spokane 
transit Authority bus traveling from Spokane to Post Falls. Spokane Transit Authority 
provides van pool bus (Van) services from the Idaho border to downtown Spokane. While 
being transported from Spokane to Post Falls her bus was violently struck from behind by 
a vehicle driven by Sydney Salzman. Ms. Eastman and 3 other individuals who were 
riding in the van were injured. (R. 172). 
2. Ms. Eastman claims that the injury caused venous thrombosis that required 
surgery. As a result of the injury and subsequent surgery she lost considerable amounts of 
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mcome and incurred medical expenses in excess of $209,237.60. In addition, Ms. 
Eastman suffers residual complications from the injury. (R. 172). 
3. Ms. Salzman was insured with Progressive Insurance Company with policy 
limits of $50,000.00 per person/$100,000.00 per accident. On June 12, 2015 Ms. 
Salzman's insurance company settled with Jennifer Eastman for policy limits of 
$50,000.00.(R.172, 197-199). 
4. The Spokane Transit Authority bus that Ms. Eastman was a passenger in 
provides UIM coverage in the amount of $60,000.00, total for each bodily injury 
occurrence for passengers who are injured in its vehicles. After exhausting Ms. Salzman's 
insurance limits the 4 injured claimants made claims against the $60,000.00 UIM 
coverage. The parties and their attorneys mutually agreed to settle the claims for the 
policy limits of $60,000.00.00, with $48,846.00 going to Ms. Eastman. (R. 200-02). 
Clearly Ms. Eastman suffered the greatest injury. 
5. During the time period relevant to this matter, January 27, 2014 through 
July 27, 2014, Farmers had issued a policy of insurance to Plaintiff. Under the policy, 
Plaintiff had $500,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage (UIM). (R. 29, 53, 77, 79-
80, 215-284). 
6. In an email dated January 22, 2016 Plaintiff informed Farmers of Plaintiffs 
intent to settle the STA UIM portion of the insurance coverage and provided Farmers 
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with the option to purchase that interest. (R. 203-05). On February 10, 2016 Plaintiff 
received a letter from Farmers denying coverage under Ms. Eastman's UIM coverage. (R. 
206-09). 
7. On April 15, 2016 Plaintiff provided a settlement demand/proof of loss to 
Farmers Insurance demanding policy limits minus credit for amounts recovered from 
other available coverage. (R. 210-214 ). 
8. Farmers bases its UIM coverage denial on the policy language relating to 
"other insurance": 
COVERAGE C-1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage (FORM W2449102) 
Other Insurance 
3. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured 
car or insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that vehicle has no 
other insurance applicable to this part. 
(R. 278). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court applies the same standard as the district court when reviewing 
a grant of a motion for summary judgment. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L. C., 140 
Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Filing cross-motions for summary judgment 
does not change the standard of review and the Court evaluates each motion on its merits. 
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Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000). Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "This Court 
will liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment and will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in favor of that party." 
Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008). The entire 
record is freely reviewed to determine if either side was entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law and to determine whether inferences drawn by the district court are 
reasonably supported by the record. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 
630,634,226 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
For the purposes of this appeal, there are no disputed facts in issue and the issues 
presented are purely legal. Summary judgment in this declaratory judgment should be 
granted to Plaintiff. The Court should find that Plaintiff is entitled to UIM coverage 
because ( 1) public policy supports covering Plaintiff for the offset damages, and (2) the 
language in Plaintiffs insurance agreement supports UIM coverage. 
Legal Argument 
Plaintiff first argues that (A) the 2008 UIM mandate in I.C. § 41-2502 creating 
public policy entitles her to UIM coverage in this case. Plaintiff then argues that (B) the 
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additional language mandated in 2008 in Plaintiffs insurance policy grants her UIM 
coverage under the plain language. Plaintiff then explores how (C) the 2008 mandated 
language (Disclosure) must be deemed included in the insurance policy. Finally, Plaintiff 
argues that (D) she is entitled to UIM coverage because Defendant has not clearly and 
precisely limited UIM coverage under the terms of Plaintiffs insurance policy. 
1. PUBLIC POLICY 
A. The Public Policy Behind Requiring UIM Coverage Supports Plaintiff's UIM 
Coverage Claim With Farmers. 
Plaintiff is entitled to UIM coverage under Idaho public policy. In 2008, the Idaho 
Legislature amended LC. § 41-2502 to require insurance companies to offer UIM 
coverage. (R. 314-316) The UIM requirement created public policy to protect Idahoans 
from being undercompensated for their injuries: 
The Legislature clearly enacted the UIM amendments to protect the citizens of this 
State from being undercompensated for their injuries ... " 
Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 627 (2011). By 
requiring UIM coverage, the Idaho Legislature acted to protect citizens from underinsured 
drivers: 
The Legislature accordingly intends to protect Idaho's citizens from driver's 
carrying policies above the statutorily required policy levels but who have 
insurance insufficient to compensate their tort victims. 
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Id. at 624. The Legislature mandated UIM coverage for two reasons: (1) to protect 
Idahoans with catastrophic injuries who would find themselves without sufficient 
coverage; and (2) to avoid the anomaly that injured Idaho motorists be in a position to 
collect more if the at fault driver had no insurance than if the driver was underinsured. Id. 
at 626. 
Prior to 2008, Idaho statutes did not contain a UIM mandate. The absence of any 
UIM mandate prohibited insured's from making public policy arguments for UIM 
coverage: 
[T]he sole reason there was no clear public policy regarding UIM coverage 
was because 'Idaho statutes do not regulate underinsured motorist 
coverage.' 
Hill, 150 Idaho at 623 ( citing Andrae v. Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Prgm. Underwriters, 
145 Idaho 33, 36 (2007)). 
We have rejected public policy challenges related to UIM policies only 
because 'our statutes do not require an automobile insurer to include 
underinsured vehicle coverage in its policies or even to offer this coverage 
to its insureds. 
Id. (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Buffa, 119 Idaho 345, 347, 806 P.2d 438, 440 (1991) 
( emphasis added). 
The 2008 UIM mandate created public policy related to UIM coverage and 
changed prior Idaho case law. After 2008, the Hill case was the first to apply public 
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policy considerations to UIM coverage. Hill involved an insured's claim for UIM when 
the insured had settled with the tortfeasor for below policy limits for bodily injury. The 
question was whether an "exhaustion" clause in the insurance contract requiring the 
insured to deplete the tortfeasor's bodily insurance limit before making a claim against 
the UIM violated public policy. In ruling that it violated public policy, the Court focused 
on the 2008 UIM mandate as public policy that UIM exhaustion clauses thwart "the 
Legislature's goal of protecting motorists from underinsured drivers." Id. at 626. The 
Court noted that requiring insureds to secure full recovery would cause unnecessary 
litigation costs, expense, and delay if an insured was required to secure full recovery prior 
to making a UIM claim. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that Idaho courts would have to 
suffer through unnecessary litigation so that claimants could preserve their benefits. Id. 
The Court agreed with other jurisdictions finding exhaustion clauses against public 
policy, citing the importance placed on UIM coverage public policy: 
[T]he insured' s ability to recover UIM benefits should be 'scrupulously 
guarded' because 'UIM coverage is intended to provide excess coverage to 
compensate an insured against losses for which there would otherwise be no 
coverage." 
Id (emphasis added) (citing Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 599 S.E.2d 720, 725-
26 (2004). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 8 
Recently, the Supreme Court discussed UIM public policy when analyzing anti-
stacking language. See Gearhart v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 160 Idaho 664, 665 
(2016). In Gearhart, the Supreme Court applied the public policy considerations 
addressed in the Hill case and found that allowing an insured to stack UIM coverage 
supported public policy. Id. at 668. In Gearhart the plaintiff was injured while traveling 
in a vehicle not owned by his parents and made a claim under each parents' separate UIM 
policy of $300,000 each. Id. at 666. The insurance company argued that policy reasons 
supported rejecting the stacking of two $300,000 UIM polices: anti-stacking should be 
upheld to make insurance affordable to other prospective insured. The Court found this 
argument unpersuasive: 
It is posited that the anti-stacking provisions must be upheld in order to 
make insurance affordable and available to other prospective insureds. 
However, it is not clear that this is particularly accurate under the 
circumstances of this case. Both of Trent's parents bought Enumclaw 
policies that purportedly covered their child for up to $300,000 in UIM 
benefits in the event of an accident. If the parents had decided to purchase 
just one policy with a much higher UIM benefit, it is debatable that the 
premium would have been more than twice as much. Indeed, it is intuitive 
that one single policy with a substantially higher limit would have likely 
been less than the cost of two separate policies with lower limits. Since the 
record does not disclose the premium costs that might have been involved 
under either scenario, it is debatable as to whether or not public policy 
would be better served by enforcing the anti-stacking limit contended for by 
Enumclaw under the facts of this case. What we do know with some 
certainty, however, is that reversal of the district court's judgment 
would result in Trent being substantially undercompensated for his 
injuries, even though reasonable insurance buyers would be excused if 
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they were to conclude that two separate $300,000 UIM policies 
purchased by two separate purchasers would be available to cover 
injuries exceeding $600,000. We therefore affirm the district court's 
holding, but on the ground that the actual language employed in the 
Enumclaw policies is confusing to the extent that it is ineffective to 
establish a barrier to recovery of Trent's actual damages in the full amount 
of the limit provided in each of the two Enumclaw policies 
Id. at 668-669 ( emphasis added). 
Gearhart reiterated that public policy supports fully compensating tort victims: 
It is difficult to see how the public policy enunciated in Hill is advanced by 
allowing Enumclaw to cause Trent to be undercompensated for his injuries 
by imposing the barrier of the anti-stacking provision under the 
circumstances of this case. It must be recalled that Trent's parents each 
purchased an Enumclaw policy, each paying the required premium in order 
to obtain $300,000 in UIM benefits for the protection of their child. As 
noted above, Enumclaw concedes for purposes of this action that Trent's 
damages "exceeded the coverages available under all policies at issue in 
this case." If the barrier sought to be imposed by Enumclaw is allowed 
to be imposed, Trent will end up getting undercompensated by more 
than half. Thus, either his parents or perhaps the taxpayers will end up 
having to bear the additional costs for his medical care. 
Id. at 668 ( emphasis added). Premiums were paid for both policies and public policy 
supported stacking both UIM limits to fully compensate the Plaintiff. 
The Purdy case and other iurisdictions: 
Now that public policy attaches to UIM coverage, prior Idaho cases dealing with 
UIM must be re-visited. For instance, Purdy v. Farmers Insurance Company, 65 P.3d 184 
(2002), would not be good case law. In Purdy, the Court denied UIM coverage under 
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facts and language similar to our case, finding that the language in the policy was not 
ambiguous. But Purdy only dealt with contract interpretation arguments: public policy 
arguments were not argued or addressed. With the 2008 UIM mandate, the law 
changed-invalidating Purdy's holding. 
Other jurisdictions have found that "other insurance" provisions related to UIM 
denials violate public policy. See Kline v. Famers Insurance Exchange, 277 Neb. 874 
(2009); (Exclusion denying UIM coverage when a person is injured while occupying a 
vehicle they do not own but is insured for UIM coverage under another's policy was void 
and against public policy); Estate of Sinn by Sinn v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 288 Ill.All.3d 
193 (1997) ("Other insurance" provision that states that the insurer would not provide 
UIM benefits for vehicle other than the owned insured car unless the other owner lacked 
UIM coverage was against public policy.); Veach v. Farmers Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 845 
(Iowa 1990) (UIM policy exclusion is void against public policy because it excludes from 
coverage any vehicle not owned by the named insured which has UIM coverage under a 
different policy.) Finding UIM coverage in this case is consistent with these other 
jurisdictions. 
Public Policy in this case 
In our case, UIM coverage is now mandated and the public policy identified in Hill 
supports a finding of UIM coverage here. Plaintiff received a total of $98,846.00 in 
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compensation from the tortfeasor and the Van's UIM coverage. Plaintiff claims damages 
well above this total amount recovered. As Hill identified, UIM is meant to protect Idaho 
citizens from drivers with insufficient insurance coverage. To deny Plaintiff a UIM claim 
would leave her in a position where she suffered a catastrophic injury "without redress." 
This flies directly in the face of the UIM public policy. 
Importantly, Plaintiff would have fully recovered under her UIM if the Van had no 
insurance at all. 1 The Hill case specifically spoke out against this contradictory situation 
where Plaintiff would be in a better position if the Van carried no coverage at all. This is 
the exact situation the Hill case was seeking to avoid. Placing a Plaintiff in a position to 
recover more if a driver was uninsured than underinsured is an anomaly of prior case law: 
an anomaly that the UIM mandate is meant to rectify. Here, Plaintiff should benefit the 
same from insurance coverage she purchased whether the Van carried UIM or not. 
The analysis in the Gearhart case is analogous to our case. Plaintiff asserts special 
damages (in excess of $209,237.60) well above the total recoverable insurance of 
$98,846.00, which includes considerable amounts of income and incurred medical 
expenses. Just like in Gearhart, Farmers is trying to avoid stacking UIM benefits in this 
case. As Gearhart emphasized, Plaintiff paid for UIM coverage of $500,000 under her 
1 Farmers argues that since the Van had (the bare minimum) UIM coverage, Plaintiff cannot seek 
the benefit of her remaining $500,000 UIM policy. Under the terms of the "other insurance" 
provision, this exlusion does not apply if the Van has no insurance at all. (R. 275, 314) 
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policy. If she is denied the right to recover UIM benefits she paid for she will be 
undercompensated for her injury. The public policy identified in Hill and Gearhart 
supports Plaintiffs UIM coverage. 
The bottom line is, Plaintiff paid for UIM coverage of $500,000 under her policy. 
Plaintiff asserts damages well above the total recoverable insurance of $98,846.00. 
Plaintiffs right to recover UIM benefits must be "scrupulously guarded ... to provide 
excess coverage to compensate [plaintiff] against losses for which there would otherwise 
be no coverage." Hill, 150 Idaho at 626. Plaintiff deserves to be compensated for 
coverage she paid for. Denial ofUIM coverage in this instance violates public policy. 
2. INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT 
B. Under The Terms Of The Insurance Agreement, Plaintiff Is Entitled To UIM 
Coverage. 
1. 2008 Language Defining UJM 
The 2008 amendments to I.C. § 41-2502 mandated language that provides UIM in 
this case. The general rule is that because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, 
typically not subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the 
contract "must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. 
Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, (1996). The question of whether a policy is 
ambiguous is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Baker v. 
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Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 130 Idaho 415, 416-417 (Ct. App. 1997). "To 
determine whether a policy is ambiguous, the Court must ask whether the policy 'is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation."' Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 
851, 853 (1995). Subsequent changes in state law that are designed to protect the public 
welfare can invalidate a contract provision on public policy grounds. Hill v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 623 (2010). 
In 2008, the legislature added language to I.C. § 41-2502 mandating that every 
UIM policy contain a form defining UIM coverage. The Legislature required a standard 
disclosure form that informs policy holders about their UIM coverage. This standard 
language specifically describes UIM as providing "difference in limits" or "offset" 
coverage to insureds when there is insufficient insurance coverage from other owners or 
operators: 
IDAHO UNINSURED MOTORIST & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (FORM 8169101) 
UIM coverage may pay damages for bodily injury to an insured person who 
is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or operator of a vehicle 
with inadequate limits of liability insurance coverage. 
UIM coverage is offered in different form by different insurers, and 
insurers are not required to offer more than one type of UIM coverage. 
There are two commonly available forms of UIM coverage - "Difference in 
limits" (or "Offset") Coverage and "Excess" Coverage. Your insurance 
policy offers "Difference in Limits" which is briefly explained below: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 14 
• "Difference in Limits" (or "Offset") Coverage - The policy's UIM 
coverage limits are reduced or eliminated by the amount of any damages 
recovered by any insured, from or on behalf of any underinsured(s) owner 
or operator(s). 
(R. 275,314). (emphasis added). 
The language of the Disclosure plainly states that the insured's recovery from its 
own UIM is merely "offset" by the amount she recovers from "any underinsured." The 
Disclosure identifies an "offset" irrespective of who is underinsured, whether it be an 
owner or operator. The remaining UIM isn't terminated, but the insured is able to recover 
the "difference in [the] limits." The Disclosure's plain language defines UIM coverage to 
be offset by the amount Plaintiff recovered from any other owners/operators. Farmers' 
position that Plaintiff loses her entire UIM benefit is contrary to the language in the 2008 
insurance policy. 
Farmers relies on Purdy, which found an insured's UIM could be cutoff if the 
insured was riding in a third party vehicle. The denial of UIM in Purdy revolved around 
the old "other insurance" policy language, which reads: 
Other Insurance 
3. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured 
car or your insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that vehicle has 
no other insurance applicable to this part. 
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(R. 277-78). Farmers denied Plaintiffs UIM claim on the basis of this "other insurance" 
provision, arguing that the Supreme Court in its 2002 Purdy decision found this provision 
was not ambiguous and excluded UIM coverage. While this is an accurate description of 
Purdy 's holding in 2002, the insurance policy in that case is different from the modified 
post-2008 insurance policy. The 2008 Disclosure modified UIM coverage: UIM now is 
"offset" by "any damages" recovered from "any underinsured owner or operator." 
Reading the "Other Insurance" provision as Purdy suggests directly conflicts with 
the 2008 UIM definition. The legislature specifically described how UIM is to function: 
an insured's UIM is merely reduced, or offset, by other available coverage. Under the 
Purdy interpretation, UIM would be eliminated entirely when there is recovery from 
another source. The 2008 legislative change ofUIM invalidates the Purdy holding. 
The plain language "offset" applies in Plaintiffs case. Plaintiff received 
$50,000.00 from the at-fault party, and $48,846.00 from the underinsured operator she 
was riding in. As the Disclosure explains, Plaintiffs UIM claim must be offset by any 
damages she recovers from "any underinsured owner or operator." Plaintiff recovered 
$98,846.00. Consistent with the terms of the insurance agreement and the Disclosure, 
Plaintiff is entitled to pursue the remaining difference in limits of $401,154.00 from her 
own policy. 
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C. The Disclosure Is Part Of The Insurance Policy. 
In denying UIM coverage to Plaintiff, Farmers maintains that the Disclosure is not 
part of the insurance policy and it does not have to recognize the language contained 
therein. The Disclosure is part of the insurance policy for numerous reasons: (1) Idaho 
Code mandates its inclusion, and Farmers added additional language to the Disclosure 
delivered to the Plaintiff; (2) the Disclosure is incorporated by reference; and (3) to ignore 
the Disclosure would create illusory coverage. 
1. The Disclosure Must Be Part Of The Policy Based On J.C. § 41-2502(3) And 
Farmers Representations. 
Defendant argues that the Disclosure, by its own terms, is not an agreement and 
cannot ben included in Plaintiffs insurance policy. This cannot be the case as it would 
make I.C. § 41-2502(3) meaningless and mere surplusage. The Disclosure is required to 
be included in any insurance policy, and Farmers certified that it was part of the policy. 
(R. 97-98) 
When interpreting the meaning of the language contained in a statute, this Court's 
task is to give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. Gumprecht v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983). In construing a statute, the Supreme Court 
may examine the language used, reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the 
policy behind the statutes. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983). It 
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is incumbent upon this Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify it, and 
it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a 
superfluous statute. Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 629 P.2d 
662 (1981 ). The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere 
surplusage of provisions included therein. Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 
P.2d 332 (1984) . 
. The Disclosure is required to be included with the UIM insurance policy. See I.C. 
§ 41-2502 (3); Department of Insurance Bulletin No. 08-08. (R. 314-16). If the 
Disclosure was not part of the policy, as Farmer's argues, the mandatory language of the 
statute requiring its inclusion would be meaningless. 
Furthermore, not only does the statue require the Disclosure be included in the 
policy, Farmers made affirmative representations in the Disclosure by adding additional 
language. (R. 97-98) Farmers affirmatively represented under the definition of UIM to 
include the statement that "Your insurance policy offers "Difference in Limits" which 
is explained as follows .... " (R. 77). (Emphasis Added) Farmers further represented to 
Ms. Eastman that her "UIM coverage limits are reduced or eliminated by the amount 
of any damages recovered by any insured, from or on behalf of any underinsured 
owner(s) or operator(s)." (R. 77) (Emphasis added). 
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In summary, the statute requires inclusion of the Disclosure and Farmers cetified 
that the Disclosure was part of the insurance contract. (R. 97-98) The Disclosure must 
have meaning; otherwise the 2008 amendments to the statute would have no purpose. 
Farmers was aware of the Disclosure and affirmatively represented to Plaintiff that she 
had "Difference in limits" coverage in her insurance policy. The Disclosure is included. 
2. The Disclosure Statement Is Incorporated Into The Policy By Reference. 
A signed agreement may incorporate by reference to another agreement, which is 
not signed by the parties, if the terms to be incorporated are adequately identified and 
readily available for inspection by the parties. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 320, 246 P.3d 961, 973 (2010). 
In this case, the Disclosure was identified in the policy ( actually included) and was 
available for inspection. On top of that, Defendant actually modified the language of the 
Disclosure, evidencing its awareness of the Disclosure and binding it to the terms 
contained therein. The terms of the Disclosure are incorporated into and define terms in 
the insurance policy. Farmers identified the page in question as being part of the policy 
and modified the language to explain the type of coverage Plaintiff had. (R. 97-98). The 
modified language actually, affirmatively states, "Your insurance policy offers 
"Difference in Limits" which is explained below." (R. 275,314). 
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3. The Disclosure Is Part Of The UIM Policy, Which Creates Illusory Coverage If 
The Purdy Interpretation Prevails. 
When an insurance policy purports to offer underinsured motorist coverage, then 
effectively bars an insured from coverage through exclusions and other contractual 
provisions, then the contract is illusory and is unenforceable. See Martinez v. Idaho 
Counties Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 134 Idaho 24 7, 252 (2001 ). In Martinez, the court 
looked at a contract which was memorialized for the specific purpose of providing 
underinsured motorist coverage. After parsing through the contractual provisions related 
to underinsured motorist coverage, the Court noted that the exclusions operated to 
effectively bar an insured from UIM coverage: 
"2. By use of definitions and exclusions, the policy creates only an 
illusion of uninsured motorist coverage. 
While Martinez agrees that he was excluded from uninsured/underinsured 
motorist coverage because of the employee exclusion, he urges that the 
coverage is illusory because every possible claimant can be excluded. Upon 
reviewing the policy, we find merit to this argument. 
To maintain a claim under this policy, a claimant injured in an accident with 
an uninsured motorist would first need to fit within the definition of an 
insured under the policy. In the policy issued to the City, the general 
insuring agreement defines who is an insured for uninsured/ underinsured 
motorist protection." 
Id. at 251. 
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However, the exclusions provisions were so extensive that they effectively failed 
to provide coverage, except under rare circumstances.2 The Court held that: 
Upon review of these requirements and exclusions, it appears that if any 
actual coverage does exist it is extremely minimal and affords no realistic 
protection to any group or class of injured persons. The declarations page 
of the policy contains language and words of coverage, then by 
definition and exclusion takes away the coverage. The fact that there 
might be some small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist 
does not change the reality that, when the policy is considered in its entirety, 
the City was receiving only an illusion of coverage for its premiums. This 
Court will not allow policy limitations and exclusions to defeat the 
precise purpose for which the insurance is purchased. Bonner County v. 
Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 101 Idaho 772, 776, 620 P.2d 1102, 1106 
(1980) ([T]he ambiguous circumstance in which a policy has been issued 
purportedly providing coverage but with exclusionary provisions which, if 
applied, would narrow that coverage to "defeat the very purpose or object 
of the insurance.")." 
Id. at 252 ( emphasis added). 
2 Policy Provisions: (specifically set forth previously) 
1. Using the vehicle. To be covered under the uninsured/underinsured motorist section, the 
claimant must have been using the automobile at the time of the accident. 
2. Legally responsible for the automobile. In addition to using the automobile, the injured party 
must also have been legally responsible for the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Once both of these requirements have been met, a claimant must then demonstrate that the 
exclusions do not apply. The exclusions to the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage are 
as follows: 
Exclusions: (specifically set forth previously) 
(a) Reasonably expected. Any bodily injury or property damage which the City expected or 
reasonably could have expected is excluded. 
(b) Insured's property. Any property owned by the City which is damaged in an accident is 
excluded from uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 
(c) Bodily injuries to Employees. This excludes any person who could file a claim under workers' 
compensation, unemployment compensation, disability benefits, employers liability, or for 
indemnity or contribution by any person for bodily injuries to an employee. 
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Similar to the Martinez court, the policy in this case creates an illusion of UIM 
coverage and is ineffective in excluding UIM coverage. As identified in section 3 above, 
the Disclosure mandated by the 2008 amendment defines UIM to be "reduced" by 
coverage from other sources. Under the exclusion, using the Purdy interpretation, UIM 
would be eliminated when there is UIM from another source ( e.g., any UIM from another 
vehicle). The Disclosure (and 2008 amendments) strictly establishes an "offset" for the 
remaining recovery, whereas the exclusion completely eliminates recovery. If the court 
were to apply the exemption as interpreted by Purdy, the "difference in limits" becomes 
an illusory situation: if another vehicle has UIM, the exclusion eliminates recovery and 
does not provide a "difference in limits." As the Martinez court explained, this is not 
permissible. 
D. Unless There Is "Clear And Precise Language" Restricting Coverage, UIM 
Coverage Is Available To Plaintiff. 
Based on the Disclosure and the insurance policy language, a reasonable insurance 
buyer would believe that she had UIM coverage in this case. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recently stated, "[t]he burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it 
wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Gearhart, 160 Idaho at 667 (2016) (citing 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Ct,., 149 Idaho 299, 320-21 (2010)). Farmers 
has not restricted UIM coverage. 
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In Gearhart, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the insurance company failed to 
"clearly and precisely" restrict UIM coverage in its anti-stacking provision. Id. In that 
case, a divorced couple owned separate, identical $300,000 UIM policies for their child 
who was severely injured while riding in a third party vehicle. Id. at 665. The child sought 
to recover $300,000 under each policy, for a total of $600,000 in coverage. Id. The 
insurance company argued that the anti-stacking provision precluded the child from 
stacking the limits. Id. The court reviewed the insurance policy language and concluded 
the anti-staking language did not "clearly and precisely" restrict UIM coverage: 
The language employed in the Other Insurance provision of the two 
Enumclaw policies is confusing to the extent of being an ineffective barrier 
to the coverage afforded by both policies. The provision reads: 
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only 
our share. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability 
bears to the total of all applicable limits. If this policy and any 
other policy providing similar insurance apply to the accident, 
the maximum limit of liability under all the policies shall be 
the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy. 
However, insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you 
do not own shall be excess over any other collectible 
insurance. 
Good luck to the average insurance buyer in deciphering the meaning of 
this provision. 
Gearhart, 160 Idaho at 667. The Plaintiff in Gearhart was able to stack both UIM 
benefits for a total of $600,000 coverage. Id. at 669. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 23 
In our case, reading the language of the Disclosure with other language in the 
policy, Farmers does not "clearly and precisely" restrict Plaintiffs UIM coverage. 
Reading the "Other Insurance" provision in the insurance policy by itself is insufficient to 
limit Plaintiffs UIM: 
Other Insurance 
3. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured 
car or your insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that vehicle has 
no other insurance applicable to this part. 
(R. 277-78). This provision doesn't identify what "no other insurance applicable to this 
part" means. To a reasonable insurance purchaser, this provision could provide a limit to 
coverage when traveling in a vehicle other than the insured vehicle in a variety of 
circumstances: the driver/owner doesn't have any liability insurance available, the 
driver/owner is uninsured, the driver/owner is underinsured, or merely the driver/owner 
has inadequate liability or underinsurance coverage. This language does not "clearly and 
precisely" restrict Plaintiff from stacking her own UIM coverage on top of UIM coverage 
from a third party. 
The situation is made worse for the Plaintiff and other insureds when considering 
other confusing and conflicting portions of Farmers' UIM policy. For instance, the C-1 
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Underinsured Motorist Coverage supplement appears to extend coverage resulting from 
injury to the insured from any underinsured vehicle: 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover 
as damages from the owner or operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
(R. 277). 
Furthermore, the Disclosure defines UIM as affirmatively providing additional 
coverage, which is "offset" by payment from other insurance: 
UIM coverage may pay damages for bodily injury to an insured person who 
is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or operator of a vehicle 
with inadequate limits of liability insurance coverage. 
UIM coverage is offered in different form by different insurers, and 
insurers are not required to offer more than one type of UIM coverage. 
There are two commonly available forms ofUIM coverage - "Difference in 
limits" ( or "Offset") Coverage and "Excess" Coverage. Your insurance 
policy offers "Difference in Limits" which is briefly explained below: 
• "Difference in Limits" (or "Offset") Coverage - The policy's UIM 
coverage limits are reduced or eliminated by the amount of any damages 
recovered by any insured, from or on behalf of any underinsured(s) 
owner or operator(s). 
(R. 275), (emphasis added). As the Disclosure states, UIM is only reduced or 
"offset" by insurance recovered from other underinsured. Nothing in the C-1 
supplement or the Disclosure eliminates Plaintiffs UIM just because there is UIM 
from other sources. Echoing the words of Justice Burdick, in regards to these 
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seemingly conflicting UIM policy prov1s1ons, "[g]ood luck to the average 
insurance buyer in deciphering the meaning ofth[ese] provision[s]." Gearhart, 160 
Idaho at 667. 
In summary, the Disclosure indicates that UIM coverage will only be 
"offset" by limits paid by other policies for an insured's claims. The C-1 UIM 
Disclosure supplement indicates UIM is available to any insured when an owner or 
operator is underinsured. This language would lead a reasonable insurance buyer 
to believe that she would have UIM coverage while traveling in another vehicle if 
there was insufficient insurance to cover her injuries. Farmers has not clearly and 
precisely restricted coverage-in fact the language indicates the contrary: that 
there is coverage. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2008 amendments to I.C. § 41-2502 created public policy and contractual 
UIM coverage in this case. Consistent with Hill and Gearhart, the Court should find the 
Plaintiff is entitled to UIM coverage under her policy. 
Dated ~day of June, 2 
,.___ -
By:-+-~-----:,..,.C-~~~---+-.f--~~~~-
A. CRAR , SB#85I9 
OMANICO & CHUANG, P.S. 
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